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Abstract: This paper is focused on the Hayekian understanding of the operation of the 
market as the continuous solution of a co-ordination problem in a decentralised decision-making 
system. The aim is to show the reasons why the solution of this problem is imperfect. These 
reasons lie, on the one hand, in deficiencies in the mechanisms to which Hayek ascribes the task 
of solving the co-ordination problem and, on the other hand, in the implications of the Keynesian 
view on expectations and the workings of the market process. In this regard, the problem of co-
ordination in a Hayekian world would have different implications if Keynes’s theory were taken 
into consideration and the possibility of mistakes in an uncertain world were not underestimated. 
 
1. Introduction 
Within the ongoing debate between Austrian and Post Keynesian economists, 
comparisons of the Hayekian and Keynesian theories of expectations have come to be a prolific 
source of controversy. So much so that it has been claimed that some of these comparisons force 
Keynes’s thought to fit in Hayek’s theoretical framework and, as a consequence, the former is not 
only diluted in the latter, but it seems more precariously founded  (Carabelli and De Vecchi, 
2001a). Among these controversial comparisons, the Butos & Koppl paper of 1997 occupies a 
particularly relevant place. Their aim in comparing these theories is to draw a conclusion 
regarding which of them holds water. Unsurprisingly, their conclusion is that Hayek’s theory of 
expectations is the more general: ‘a Hayekian theory is needed to understand a Keynesian world’ 
(1997, p. 329). 
 In order to show the lack of sound foundations to this conclusion, Carabelli & De Vecchi 
have followed a strategy primarily grounded in rejecting the characterisation as subjectivist which 
Austrian authors such as Butos & Koppl have made of Keynes’s view on expectations.
2 They, 
                                                 
2 In this regard, Böhm has even stated that ‘Keynes, in his insistence of the rôle of expectations, 
may turn out to be the “master of subjectivism”’ (1989, p. 61). Nevertheless, note that, in his ‘Post-
Keynesian Economics: Towards Coherence’, a Post Keynesian author as Arestis has described ‘what 
Keynes labelled as profit expectations of the business community’ as ‘a purely subjective concept which is 
not susceptible to probabilistic manipulation’ (1996, p. 124). 
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accordingly, have restated the objective and rational nature of expectations in the Keynesian 
conception (see Carabelli & De Vecchi, 2001a, 2004; Butos & Koppl, 1993, 1997, 2004). In a 
parallel debate focused on Butos & Koppl’s paper too, Burczak, in contrast to the objectivist 
thesis, has adopted Davis’s (1994) view of Keynes as the architect of an intersubjectivist 
understanding of expectations. On this basis, his main criticism against the Hayekian theory of 
expectations is that the relative stability of circumstances is a sine qua non of the self-regulatory 
capacity of the market which this theory predicts. 
As a contribution to these discussions, this paper develops an argument which follows a 
different path. This path is not based on any concrete conception of the nature of expectations, but 
attempts to use critically any possible way of conceiving them. In particular, the discussion will 
be set up in terms of a ‘Hayekian world’ in which the market is understood as an exchange 
network in which a great number of individuals are interacting with each other. Once this view of 
the operation of the market has been chosen as the framework of reasoning, the aim will be to 
show why, in spite of the Hayekian theory of expectations which Butos & Koppl have developed, 
the solution of the co-ordination problem among the actions autonomously adopted by the 
participants in the exchange network is imperfect. That is, why intertemporal co-ordination can 
take place at a low level and on occasion, during economic crises, at a clearly precarious level. 
The reasons for this lie in the deficiencies in the mechanisms and institutions to which Hayek 
ascribes the task of solving the co-ordination problem. In addition, they are to be found in 
Keynes’s conception of the workings of the market and in his conception of expectations. That is, 
in contrast to what Butos & Koppl state (1997, p. 329), it can be said that the magnitude of the 
co-ordination problem in a Hayekian world can only be fully grasped if the possibility of 
mistakes in an uncertain world is not underestimated and Keynes’s theory is taken into 
consideration. For this theory is able to explain discoordination, unemployment or mistaken 
planned actions in an ‘unhampered market’ without ‘Big Players’.  4
In this vein, the starting point of the argument adopted in this paper is Hayek’s 
conception of the market as a co-ordination problem. The end-point is what cannot be explained 
by the Hayekian theory of expectations which Butos & Koppl have proposed—particularly, the 
scarcity of investment decisions in economic crises. In between, the aim is to show how imperfect 
the solution of the co-ordination problem brought about by market forces is. 
The argument is developed as follows: in Section 2, the Hayekian understanding of the 
market process as a co-ordination problem and the features of the solution of this problem are 
expounded. In Section 3, the operation of the mechanisms and institutions which, according to 
Hayek, solve the co-ordination problem is described. In Section 4, the reasons why these 
mechanisms and institutions only imperfectly solve this problem are discussed. In Section 5, 
Keynes’s view on the logic of the market and the nature of expectations is used to show why the 
forces of the market might bring about an unsatisfactory solution to the co-ordination problem. 
 
2. Social order as a succession of correspondences between supply and demand 
The main concern of any discipline which deals with human matters should be, according 
to Hayek (1983 [1973], p. 37), the question of how an orderly coexistence among the mass of 
individuals which constitute society is possible. In his attempt to answer this, Hayek develops a 
theoretical conception which is built around the concept of ‘spontaneous social order’. 
Particularly, the spontaneous social order brought about by ‘the anonymous and seemingly 
irrational forces’ (Hayek, 1980 [1948], p. 24) on which the free market operation is based. These 
forces take take shape in the interrelation among the actions autonomously undertaken by the 
members of the social whole in the attempt to reach their aims (see Hayek, 1978, pp. 71-97; 1983 
[1973], pp. 36-8). 
The relevance of spontaneous order in Hayek’s theoretical system stems from the fact 
that he ascribes to spontaneous social forces the capacity to generate an order which—given the 
known decision-making systems—is the relatively best adapted to circumstances. Moreover, the  5
chain of collective results endogenously engendered is not only adapted to particular 
circumstances, but to the flux of changing circumstances. The order which emerges from these 
spontaneous forces is not, therefore, an end-point. It is a permanent state of order spontaneously 
altered and constantly adapted to the continuously changing circumstances of the social process. 
The reason why the market is able to generate this level of adaptation is grounded in its 
institutional framework’s capacity to solve in the relatively most efficient way the economic 
problem of society, which, for Hayek, ‘is a problem of the utilization of knowledge’ (1980 
[1948], pp. 77-78). In this regard, the main feature of the market’s institutional framework is that 
individuals have a protected sphere of liberty in which they freely and autonomously decide how  
to use their particular knowledge of time and place in the attempt to achieve their own aims. This 
decentralised nature of the market’s decision-making process enables the potential use of all the 
dispersed knowledge of time and place, which is individually possessed and cannot be collected 
and processed in its totality by any individual or collective agent (Hayek, 1979 [1952], p. 117; 
1980 [1948], p. 77). 
From her sphere of freedom, the individual, in the attempt to achieve her material aims, 
would give others what they want in return for what she wants. As a result of the constant 
repetition of these mutual transactions, a dense exchange network would be created and the social 
aggregate would be continuously being constructed and reconstructed. Indeed, following von 
Mises (1949, p. 301), Hayek asserts that ‘the only ties which hold the whole of a Great Society 
together are purely “economic”’ (1976, p. 112).
3 
                                                 
3 As Campbell and Klaes (forthcoming) discuss and Hayek himself (1976, p. 112) states, there 
exist numerous networks of other economic relations—such as those regarding firms’ internal organisation. 
However, as far as the idea of society as a whole is concerned, exchange relations are, in accordance with 
Hayek, what holds society together in a free-market economy.  6
How could the concept of ‘social order’, then, be defined? Throughout his writings 
Hayek has provided different definitions and occasionally has discussed how it relates to 
equilibrium (see Hayek, 1980 [1948], p. 41; 1983 [1973], p. 36). Although Hayek did not 
explicitly put forward the way in which the notion of ‘social order’ will be defined in this paper, 
this definition is in tune with his conception of the market process and, particularly, with the idea 
that ‘the cash-nexus’ is the bond which unites individuals into society (Hayek, 1976, p. 112). 
Moreover, it is a conceptual possibility especially well suited to help reconstruct what Vaughn 
(1999) has called the ‘implicit economics’ of Hayek’s later writings. 
In accordance with the Hayekian transformation of the market into an exchange network 
and with the identification of social links with exchange relations, social order can be said to 
consist in the correspondence between supply and demand. This correspondence is not an end-
point or a balance of forces, but a state of order which, although maintained through time, is 
constantly modified. For it is the result and the expression of the interrelation among the actions 
undertaken by individuals in their attempt to satisfy their own aims and to adapt to the continuous 
flux of changing circumstances. In other words, it is a state of order made up of an infinite 
succession of what Snippe (1991 [1987], pp. 301-306) has referred to as ‘momentary equilibria of 
demand and supply’. In his later writings, however, Hayek mentions explicitly his preference for 
the use of the term ‘social order’ instead of ‘equilibrium’ (see Fleetwood, 1996): 
Economists usually ascribe the order which competition produces as an 
equilibrium—a somewhat misfortune term, because such an equilibrium 
presupposes that the facts have already been discovered and competition therefore 
has ceased. The concept of an ‘order’ which ... I prefer to that of equilibrium, has 
the advantage that we can meaningfully speak about an order being approached to 
various degrees, and that order can be preserved throughout a process of change .... 
This order manifests itself in the first instance in the circumstance that the  7
expectations of transactions to be effected with other members of society ... can be 
mostly realised (1978, p. 184). 
  Nevertheless, in order to show the sense of this identification between the state of social 
order and the correspondence between supply and demand, two qualifications are worth 
considering. First, the constant flux of changing circumstances, to which each participant in the 
exchange network tries to adapt her actions, is formed—other facts independent of human agency 
aside—by the rest of participants’ actions and the interrelation among them. That is, by the 
individual supplies and demands, and how they relate to each other in the exchange network. 
Accordingly, the actions undertaken by a certain individual might trigger a succession of 
adjustments in the actions of some of the other participants. Any of these adjustments, also, could 
be the starting point of a new chain of alterations and adjustments, which, in a spreading process, 
would produce new possible rearrangements, and so on. 
  Second, grounding the definition of the state of social order in the correspondence 
between supply and demand does not imply that each and every individual planned supply 
(demand) will have a corresponding demand (supply); i.e., the correspondence does not refer to 
an ‘ex ante’ match, but to an ‘ex post’ result where unsuited planned supplies and demands would 
be expelled from the market. To base Hayek’s concept of ‘social order’ on such an interpretation 
of the correspondence between supply and demand could be considered as controversial. 
Nevertheless, as one of the sections in Chapter 10 of The Mirage of Social Justice is entitled, 
‘[t]he correspondence of expectations is brought about by a disappointment of some expectations’ 
(see, also, Hayek, 1978, p. 180; 1983 [1973], p. 103). Therefore, given that Hayek explicitly 
assumes that some expectations will be disappointed, the succession of correspondences between 
supply and demand on which his concept of ‘social order’ is grounded can be understood as a 
chain of ‘ex post’ results. Indeed, most of the ‘implicit economics’ of Hayek’s writings after 
‘Economics and Knowledge’ could be interpreted as an attempt to find and explain the means by  8
which the ‘ex post’ level at which supply and demand meet is raised. For increasing this ‘ex post’ 
level would entail that it gets closer to that hypothetical ‘ex ante’ correspondence between supply 
and demand at which the ‘plans which [] individuals ... have made for action in time are mutually 
compatible’ (Hayek, 1980 [1948], p. 41). 
Moreover, even in the improbable case that the plans made up by all the participants in 
the exchange network were successful, the correspondence between supply and demand would 
not become an endless state of rest. For new possibilities to make a profit would immediately 
arise. There would always be an opportunity for Shackle’s ‘process of creation’ (see Böhm 1989, 
p. 77). Indeed, ‘[w]e act in the world precisely to change the course of events’ (Koppl & Butos, 
2001, p. 84). As a result of these actions capable of modifying events, the market process would 
be restored to its normal condition as a continuous flux of changing circumstances. In this 
environment of constant modifications, ‘some individuals will always be discovering new facts, 
and [since] we want them to make use of this new knowledge, it is clearly impossible to protect 
all expectations’ (Hayek, 1983 [1973], p. 103). 
Therefore, in accordance with the way in which the correspondence between supply and 
demand has been depicted, the state of social order does not involve, in traditional economic 
terms, full employment of available resources or the absence of (temporary) overproduction. It 
just entails a succession of ‘ex post’ correspondences between supply and demand, at whatever 
level they are taking place. In fact, given that the achievement of individuals’ aims depends on 
other individuals’ actions, society’s orderly operation can be understood in terms of a problem of 
co-ordination among the demand and supply decisions freely adopted by individuals. The 
question which stems from what Hayek called ‘the problem of the utilisation of knowledge’ and 
constitutes the heart of his ‘implicit economics’ would be, consequently, the following (see 
Caldwell, 2004, p. 303): what mechanisms and institutions characteristic of the endogenous 
workings of the market might help the level at which supply and demand meet to rise? 
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  3. Institutions and mechanisms which help solve the co-ordination problem 
  The Hayekian ‘constitutionally ignorant individual’ (Barry, 1979, p. 9) hardly knows 
anything about what happens beyond her immediate context. Hence, in order to improve the 
fitting of individuals’ actions into the flux of circumstances of the exchange network and to raise 
the point at which supply and demand meet, ‘the individual on the spot’ needs more knowledge 
(Hayek, 1980 [1948], p. 144). 
  In this regard fluctuations of relative prices would provide individuals with additional 
knowledge concerning the degree of relative scarcity of the goods which are related to their 
respective demands and supplies (see ibid., p. 84). This is the reason why Hayek defines the 
relative price system as a ‘telecommunication system’. It makes individuals aware of new 
possible opportunities which might enable them to better satisfy their aims by using the exclusive 
advantage which the knowledge of their respective ‘here’ and ‘now’ provides to them. But it also 
enables them to better fit their supplies and demands into the continuously modified 
circumstances of the market process, achieving, this way, a rise of the level at which the 
correspondence between supply and demand takes place. 
  Besides, current norms of conduct, while they are respected, establish a basic pattern of 
conduct to which individuals adapt their actions, so that they produce what could be considered a 
certain similarity in individuals’ immediate contexts. As Carabelli & De Vecchi state, 
individual’s knowledge ‘is a ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ because some of the rules in terms of 
which he acts are followed by those whose actions he interprets’ (2001a, p. 275). As a result, 
norms help to mitigate the uncertainty inherent to the activities of the members of society, and, 
therefore, contribute to a greater mutual compatibility among individuals’ planned actions. 
Norms, in brief, provide the individual with a certain extra amount of knowledge. Thus, they help 
the level at which demand and supply meet to rise. 
Norms, nevertheless, are not only one of the means by which the expectations of the 
participants in the exchange network acquire greater certainty. In addition, norms which have  10
emerged spontaneously are, for Hayek, ‘a repository of knowledge’ (Vaughn, 1999, p. 135) (see, 
also, Fleetwood, 1996, pp. 741-746). The reason why spontaneous norms of behaviour can be 
conceived of this way lies in the fact that they are the result of a selection process whose essence 
is the idea of trial and error. That is, pioneering individuals, being more or less aware of the 
meaning of their actions, would search for and try to develop innovative ways of acting which 
better satisfy their aims. If these pioneers are rewarded with success, those new ways of acting 
would become, by means of a process of imitation or whatever other spontaneous means, a spread 
regularity of behaviour—i.e., a norm (see Hayek, 1960, pp. 28-29). Therefore, the ways of acting 
which have overcome this selection process and hence have been retained would contain all the 
knowledge accumulated as a ‘result of a past process of tentative exploration’ (Hayek, 1976, p. 
9). 
As repositories of knowledge, spontaneously-emerged norms would be means which help 
participants in the exchange network to solve the problem created by their freedom of deciding. 
For the tacit stock of knowledge which inherited norms convey will tell individuals how to 
achieve what they want. If the individual is successful, the reason is ‘because his thinking and 
acting are governed by rules which have by a process of selection been evolved’ (Hayek, 1983 
[1973], p. 11); that is, norms of conduct ‘are patterns of behaviour individuals have found 
generally useful’ (Butos & Koppl, 2004, p. 243). As regards the co-ordination problem, what this 
norm-grounded success means is that the ways of acting which have been spontaneously selected 
would help the individual to better fit her planned action into the flux of demands and supplies of 
the exchange network. Moreover, assuming a dependence relationship between norms and 
expectations, Butos & Koppl state that the selection process generates norms which entail co-
ordinating expectations: ‘[e]xpectations ... are embodied in the rules governing action ... [which] 
are a product of social ...evolution. In this evolutionary view, ... [e]xpectations ... have a tendency 
toward coherence and coordination’ (1997, p. 355). Norms emerged through a spontaneous  11
process of trial and error would be, thus, another means which help to improve the resolution of 
the Hayekian problem of co-ordination. 
Nevertheless, although current norms of behaviour and relative price fluctuations help to 
rise the level at which the correspondence between supply and demand takes place, they do not 
prevent some individuals from undertaking courses of action which do not fit into the exchange 
network. On these unadapted courses of action, the effects of the selection mechanism of 
competition would be felt. As a result, only those individuals who possess the knowledge 
adjusted to the circumstances configuration and use it in a right way—or just those who behave 
luckily—can be successful. In Hayek’s words: ‘the generally beneficial effects of competition 
must include disappointing or defeating some particular expectations or intentions’ (1978, p. 
180). In this sense, if the spheres of liberty are the means to accomplish the aim of putting the 
maximum amount of knowledge of the ‘here’ and ‘now’ in a situation of being potentially used, 
competition would be in charge of determining what knowledge will be really used. It could be 
said, thus, that competition’s duty is to give the go-ahead only to mutually compatible plans of 
action, expelling decisions unadapted to the circumstances from the marketplace (see Snippe, 
1991 [1987], p. 303). As a result, competition is the mechanism which ensures, in the last resort, 
the continuous resolution of the co-ordination problem. This task will be accomplished by the 
mechanism of competition regardless of the level at which the ‘ex post’ correspondence between 
supply and demand takes place at each moment of time, and bearing in mind that, far from being 
a static situation, the solution of this problem is a succession of correspondences which gives rise 
to a state of order continuously and spontaneously modified. Competition, therefore, always 
solves the co-ordination problem—no matter how many expectations are disappointed. 
 
4. Problems with the institutions and mechanisms which help solve the co-
ordination problem  12
In a free market economy à la Hayek, therefore, the knowledge that can be potentially 
used is determined by spheres of individual freedom and the individual’s capabilities to take 
advantage of the opportunities for action which their protected domains offer them. The 
knowledge that does actually become spread throughout the exchange network depends in the last 
resort on the selective mechanism of competition. In between, price fluctuations and norms of 
behaviour would act like funnels which try to approximate the amount of knowledge which is 
being attempted to be poured into the bottle of the exchange network to what is really getting 
inside. In this section, the aim is to show why the imperfect operation of the funnels might spill 
from the bottle more knowledge—that is, more planned actions—than Hayek suggested. 
 
4.1. The price system and the succession of ‘ex post’ correspondences 
As regards the relevance which Hayek attributes to the price system in relation to the 
solution of the co-ordination problem, relative price fluctuations could be conceptualised as ‘a 
method for detecting error[s] ... when they are perceived’ (Vaughn, 1992, p. 267) and, in 
particular, for revealing how relative scarcities are being altered and not accurately satisfied. 
Conceiving the relative price system this way implies, in accordance with the ‘ex post’ nature of 
the correspondence between supply and demand, that ‘price adjustment ... entails trading at “false 
prices” [in a Walrasian sense]. Because exchanges are made at disequilibrium prices, production 
projects are begun that, in the nature of the situation, cannot possibly be completed’ (Lavoie, 
1991 [1986], p. 216) (see, also, Desai, 1994, p. 43; Lachmann, 1976, p. 55). That is to say, despite 
the price system, mistaken courses of action are not only quite possible. They are a logical 
consequence drawn from realising that there exists no possible recontracting process orchestrated 
by a fictitious Walrasian auctioneer. Indeed, many planned actions which reveal themselves as 
mistaken will be discovered only after they have occurred or are being developed. The price 
system, therefore, does not prevent some individuals’ demands from not being met or that certain 
supplies will not be purchased. Moreover, in spite of the price system’s capacity for improving  13
the match between planned supplies and demands, the correction of errors based on price 
fluctuations is far from perfect and does not imply that new mistaken actions will not be planned 
and undertaken. In other words, it does not involve a process which progressively corrects current 
errors and ends when no mistakes remain. For current price fluctuations refer to current changing 
scarcities, but there is no experience of the future, i.e., of either future shortages or abundances. 
At the same time that some previous errors are being corrected new errors are being made. 
In this sense, current scarcities, as reflected by the relative price system, are the result of 
yesterday’s expectations and the actions based on them. By means of these actions based on 
yesterday’s expectations, a certain number of individuals are able to satisfy their aims today—in 
some cases, due to pure chance. However, today’s success does not ensure that these ‘correct’ 
actions will be undertaken tomorrow. They could be unique actions. Or individuals who have 
undertaken them today might not want to undertake them again tomorrow—for instance, because 
they expect that the conditions which they think that have made these actions successful today 
might not remain or might not be so advantageous tomorrow. To put it in Burczak’s terms, these 
decision-makers who have been successful today might come to realise that ‘past profitable 
performances are no indication of future successes’ (2001b, p. 89). As a result of these possible 
changes in individuals’ successful decisions, today’s scarcities would be different from 
tomorrow’s scarcities and, therefore, today’s relative prices might lead to mistaken planned 
actions. However, what is even more evident is that a part of the actions based on yesterday’s 
expectations proves wrong today; that is, these current actions do not suit other individuals’ 
demands and supplies. Today’s scarcities, therefore, depend not just on correct decisions which 
might not be taken again tomorrow, but also on actions unadapted to the exchange network 
circumstances. Since these unadapted actions, in principle, will not still be undertaken by 
individuals tomorrow, the current scarcities which they contribute to creating will not exist 
tomorrow. Therefore, individuals who plan their future actions on the basis of today’s  14
scarcities—as shown by current relative prices—might discover tomorrow that their planned 
actions are mistaken. As Snippe has stated, ‘[t]he adjustments induced [by current prices], which 
today seem to be in the right direction, given present scarcities, may tomorrow turn out to be a 
dramatic failure’ (1991 [1987], p. 302).  
Thus, the relative price system, as Hayek stated, helps to solve the problem of co-
ordination created by a decision-making system in which many individuals plan their actions 
autonomously. However, it does not prevent individuals forming mistaken expectations and 
adopting courses of action which are not adapted to the flux of demands and supplies which 
characterises the market process. That is, it does not transform the solution of the co-ordination 
problem from an ‘ex post’ correspondence between demand and supply to an ‘ex ante’ 
correspondence. 
 
4.2. Norms of behaviour and the succession of ‘ex post’ correspondences 
As far as norms of behaviour are concerned, unadapted courses of action will be 
undertaken by some individuals despite the similarity among individuals’ immediate contexts 
they contribute to create. Norms rarely define each and every detail of the behaviours grounded in 
them. What they do is to establish a sort of basic substratum of conduct which can give rise to a 
range, within certain limits, of differentiated specific behaviours. The possibility of error in 
individual’s norm-based expectations concerning other individuals’ actions cannot, therefore, be 
completely ruled out. As Hayek himself pointed out, ‘rules serve to provide information for the 
decision of individuals, and thus help to reduce uncertainty, but they cannot determine what use 
individuals can make of this information and therefore also not eliminate “all” uncertainty’ (1976, 
p. 123). 
Besides, whether they have been explicitly called ‘norms of behaviour’ or not, there is a 
certain type of norm which is particularly interesting as regards the co-ordination problem. These  15
norms of conduct are those to which economic theory—particularly, that of Hayek and Keynes—
has referred as the means which agents use in order to predict other individuals’ behaviour or 
future outcomes. However, before proceeding, note that the aim is not to discuss whether a 
certain theoretical conception of the expectation-forming process is right or wrong, or which 
norms real economic agents actually follow. Such an aim exceeds the purposes of this paper. The 
reason why these norms deserve attention is, by contrast, to show how precarious is the basis for 
forming adequate expectations on which to ground mutually compatible actions.  
1. In this sense, let us start considering those norms mentioned by Keynes—although he 
calls them ‘conventions’ or ‘conventional judgements’—which guide individuals’ behaviour in 
what Davidson (1991) has called a ‘true uncertainty environment’; that is, in situations in which 
‘there is no scientific basis to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know’ 
(Keynes, 1973b [1937], p. 114).
4 In these circumstances, it could be said that ‘[u]ncertainty 
favors the formation of conventional expectations rather than of reasonable expectations’ 
(Carabelli & De Vecchi, 2001b, p. 232) as a means by which individuals cope with and 
rationalise their ignorance of the future. Among the norms to which individuals might resort to 
form their expectations in these situations, Keynes refers to the convention of assuming ‘that the 
existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to 
expect a change’ (Keynes, 1973a [1936], p. 152). As Keynes (1973b [1937], p. 114) himself 
suggested, the mistaken actions to which this norm might lead would be shown by any ‘candid 
                                                 
4 For the meaning of the Keynesian statement ‘we simply do not know’ in relation to the use of 
conventions, see the discussion between Butos & Koppl (1997, 2004) and Carabelli & De Vecchi (2001, 
2004). Besides this, for a comparison between the Post Keynesian concept of ‘uncertainty’ and the 
neoclassical, probabilistic approach to situations in which perfect knowledge is not assumed, see Davidson 
(1991). For a critique of the Austrian conception of uncertainty from a Post Keynesian view, see Davidson 
(1989, pp. 475-480).  16
examination’ of how serviceable a guide to the present past experience has been. Indeed, on those 
occasions in which this norm is followed, we would do so despite the fact that ‘we know that the 
present will not be replicated, even stochastically’ (Dow, 2003, p. 210). As far as the possibility 
of a stochastic replication of the present is concerned, the occurrence of this replication would 
entail that economic reality is ergodic in Davidson’s sense, i.e., that the economic future is a 
statistical reflection of the past. In this regard, as he has been at pains to show, if there are certain 
decision-making areas in which true uncertainty prevails, ‘then at least some economic processes 
are such that expectations based on past probability distribution functions can differ persistently 
from the time averages that will be generated as the future unfolds’ (Davidson, 1991, p. 133). 
Therefore, if the individual is faced with a process which will prove nonergodic, but she assumes 
its ergodicity as a result of a conventional judgement under uncertainty, she might be expelled 
from the market as future events become past. This conventional judgement might be helpful for 
individuals in their need to act, to avert paralysis. However, since this entails that individuals are 
assuming a statistical similarity between past and future which might not occur, this cannot 
prevent mistakes. That is, it cannot be avoided that some planned actions will not form part of the 
‘ex post’ correspondence between demand and supply. 
2. According to Keynes’s idea that, when we know ‘that our individual judgement is 
worthless, we endeavour to fall back on the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed’ 
(1973b [1937], p. 114), it could be said that individuals might adopt a conventional behaviour 
which would fall under the category which Dequech has called ‘a defensible conventional 
behaviour against uncertainty’. For, by following this conventional behaviour, the agent tries ‘to 
preserve his or her position relative to other people in the relevant market, since the individual 
will be behaving in a manner similar to these other people, on average’ (Dequech, 1999, p. 14). 
This conventional conduct does not necessarily entail that individuals assume that economic 
reality is ergodic when it is not so or when they do not know whether it is so, that is, it does not 
have to be interpreted in statistical terms. The possibility exists of stating that individuals,  17
assuming that ‘the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely’, take average expectation as 
a benchmark in order to plan their courses of action; but this average expectation does not have to 
be a statistical value based on past realisations. As Davis has shown, average expectation could 
be understood as the result which stems from an intersubjective structure of expectations in which 
‘each individual’s judgment is influenced by the judgment of those individuals with whom he or 
she interacts ... , recognizing that others do the same’ (1994, p. 139). Nevertheless, when 
decision-makers follow this conventional behaviour, economic decisions become ‘the product of 
an unstable balance between an average expectation that is invariably wrong yet accepted and 
each individual’s specific judgments which lack firm foundation’ (ibid., p. 129). Once again, 
therefore, the unsound foundations of this convention will make unavoidable, when it applies, the 
adoption of mistaken actions. As a result, a ‘high weight’ could be assigned to the ‘justified 
belief’ that at least some of the actions which have been planned on the basis of this convention 
will not achieve the aims for which they were undertaken.  
3. The essence of the Post Keynesian view of uncertainty could be summarised in the 
idea that ‘economic agents’ expectations can be easily frustrated’, because ‘[m]arket forces 
cannot deal with the unknowability and unpredictability of the future, and therefore can only 
disseminate incomplete, and even misleading, information’ (Arestis, 1996, p. 117). Although 
Hayek would have agreed with the idea that the future is unknown and unknowable, he would 
have rejected the rest of Arestis’s argument. Market forces, for Hayek, make possible the best and 
most extensive use, discovery and dissemination of the knowledge dispersed in the exchange 
network.  
As far as expectations are concerned, as Butos & Koppl (1997, pp. 349-350) have pointed 
out, Hayek did not develop a separate theory of expectations. Since he repeatedly argued that ‘the 
generally beneficial effects of competition must include disappointing or defeating some 
particular expectations or intentions’, there is no incompatibility between his conception of the 
co-ordination problem and understanding the solution of this problem as a succession of ‘ex post’  18
correspondences between supply and demand. Hayek, nevertheless, did also state that in the 
social order brought about by competition in a free market economy ‘the expectations of 
transactions to be effected with other members of society can be mostly realised’, i.e., contrary to 
the Post Keynesian view, expectations cannot be frustrated so easily. In this sense, Butos & 
Koppl (1993, 1997) have developed a theory of expectations in tune with Hayek´s ideas about 
knowledge and the evolution of rules. The basis of this theory, to which a brief reference has 
already been made, is that ‘expectations are implicit in the practices, rules, and reaction patterns 
governing action’ (Butos & Koppl, 1997, pp. 353-354). Expectations would share, thus, the same 
beneficial features Hayek ascribes to spontaneously-emerged norms of behaviour. That is, since 
these norms have emerged and been retained through a selective process of trial and error in 
which individuals ‘have with varying fortunes pushed into every nook and corner of their 
environment’ (Hayek, 1976, p. 9), norm-based behaviour entails circumstances-adapted planned 
decisions. Norms, hence, assure the individual who follows them that—to a certain extent—she 
will get what she wants. If expectations, as Butos & Koppl suggest, are embodied in 
spontaneously-emerged norms, they too would be a solid basis to plan actions adapted to the 
exchange network, i.e., expectations, paraphrasing Hayek, would ‘be mostly realised’. In Butos & 
Koppl’s own words, ‘the filter of profit and loss weeds out those whose habits tend to generate 
inappropriate responses to market signals, that is, those with inappropriate propensities to act. 
Losses tend to filter out inferior expectations’ (1997, p. 351). Butos & Koppl do not refer to the 
tautological argument that ‘correct expectations are correct because they are correct’. Their 
attempt to develop Hayek’s ideas regarding expectations aims at providing a Hayekian 
endogenous theory of expectations. In this sense, what losses tend to filter out are not so much 
inferior, particular expectations themselves, but norm-grounded ways of forming expectations. 
Indeed, Butos & Koppl state, right after the quotation above, that ‘[p]rofits will go to those with 
better ways of projecting earnings whether or not they understand why their forecasting 
procedures are better’ (ibid.). Their theory of expectations leads Butos & Koppl to claim, by way  19
of conclusion, that ‘individual’s expectations are more likely to generate perverse and incoherent 
outcomes’ (ibid., p. 355) when the market is dominated by what they call ‘Big Players’, which is 
an Austrian neologism which—at least, mainly—designates public intervention (see, also, 
Garrison, 1987, pp. 336-337; Koppl, 1991, p. 204; Koppl & Butos, 2001, p. 85). 
This theory of expectations will be discussed below at greater length. Here, where the 
aim is to show why the mechanisms and institutions to which Hayek ascribes the capacity to 
solve the co-ordination problem do it in an imperfect way, just a brief reference will be made to 
it. Acquired habits and practices, as much as norms and traditions which might apply, are a basis 
used by individuals to form their expectations about the future in many situations, particularly, as 
far as routine actions are concerned. However, this does not prevent some individuals’ planned 
actions from being excluded from the correspondence between supply and demand. Let us take an 
extremely simple example for illustrative purposes. The fact that a firm follows the practice of 
renewing its employees’ contracts every ‘x’ weeks does not ensure that all the workers are not 
fired after ‘x’ weeks because the firm, for instance, has gone bankrupt, or as a result of the 
collapse of the employer’s expected returns. In the correspondence between demand and supply 
relevant to this period of time, these employees do not count. It could be argued that, although 
based on an established practice, these workers were not using a correct way of forming 
expectations. The problem is that they probably did not have another possibility. Indeed, as 
Davidson has shown, nominal contracts ‘are a sensible method for dealing with true uncertainty 
whenever economic processes span a long period of calendar time’ (1991, p. 137). 
4. Although neither Keynes nor Hayek accepted that uncertainty could be dealt with in 
terms of numerical probabilities, this is the way in which neoclassical modelisation solves any 
situation in which perfect knowledge is not assumed. In this sense, it could be said that 
mainstream theory seems to assume that ascribing numerical probabilities—whether objective or 
subjective—to possible outcomes is the norm of behaviour followed by individuals in the  20
formation of expectations. A brief reference to this norm, therefore, is worth making. In relation 
to objective probabilities, the strict assumptions on which the ascription of this type of probability 
to future values rests have been expounded when discussing the stochastic replication of the past. 
As far as subjective probabilities are concerned, the neoclassical norm would give rise to an 
infinite regression. Since there is no experience of the future, any numerical distribution of 
probability on future events would be uncertain itself. If, for the sake of coherence, this 
uncertainty is transformed into risk, a certain numerical, subjective probability should be ascribed 
to the original distribution of probability, which would lead to ascribe another numerical, 
subjective probability to the former, and so on. Moreover, the original distribution of probability 
is as uncertain as the necessarily closed list of events or states of the world to which it is ascribed 
and the consequences which would be drawn from each of those events. Thus, if the individual 
still wants to be orthodoxly rational, new infinite regressions would be needed. Given these 
logical requirements, agents could hardly ‘completely dismiss the fear of tragedy because of 
unforeseeable changes during the time between choice and outcome’ (Davidson, 1991, p. 136) 
(see, also, Koppl & Rosser, 2002). To put the problem of co-ordination in probabilistic terms, if 
they followed the norm in question, the probability of some individuals forming wrong 
expectations and adopting courses of action unadapted to the exchange network would be one. 
  
5. The logic of the market and the fragility of expectations: Keynesian problems of 
the Hayekian co-ordination problem 
In the previous section, the deficiencies in the way in which the relative price system and 
the norms which govern individuals’ behaviour help to solve the co-ordination problem have 
been discussed in order to show why these mechanisms cannot ensure that ‘expectations of 
transactions to be effected can be mostly realised’. On the contrary, their contribution to the 
solution of this problem is imperfect. All we can ascertain, therefore, is that competition brings 
about a succession of ‘ex post’ correspondences between supply and demand which not only  21
implies an unpredictable amount of disappointed expectations and expelled-from-the-market 
planned actions, but does not provide the means to avoid future mistakes. For ‘”ex ante” no 
criterion of success can exist’ (Lachmann, 1976, p. 59).   
Nevertheless, besides these deficiencies in the providers of extra knowledge to the 
participants in the exchange network, there are two other reasons why the ‘ex post’ 
correspondence of supply and demand in a free market economy can take place at an 
unsatisfactory level, indeed, at a level far below what would be desirable. These reasons 
correspond to what Shackle (1989) called the two personalities of The General Theory. 
 The first of them has its roots in how effective demand evolves under economic growth. 
As a result of market logic itself, as income is increasing, if the propensity to consume is not 
modified, the amount spent in consumption would be increasing too, but not at the same rate as 
the aggregate supply price. Thus, the gap between the former and the latter would become wider. 
In order to have an effective demand great enough for continuing the growth of income, 
investment would have to grow, therefore, at rates each time greater; that is, the incentive to 
invest would have to be increasingly stronger. Otherwise, there will be an insufficiency of 
effective demand which ‘may, and often will, bring the increase of employment to a standstill 
“before” a level of full employment has been reached’ (Keynes, 1973a [1936], p. 30). 
Accordingly, if the inducement to invest is not strong enough and no measure is taken to raise 
effective demand, after the laws of the market have worked themselves out, the result could be 
‘the public scandal of wasted resources’ (see Snippe, 1986, pp. 374-375; 1991 [1987], pp. 302-
305). What this means, in terms of the correspondence between supply and demand, is a poor 
performance of the exchange network in its attempt to solve spontaneously the co-ordination 
problem. 
The second reason why the solution of the co-ordination problem can take place at a 
clearly deficient level is due to the fragility of expectations. In Section 4.2, where references have 
been made to expectations, the aim was to argue that the norms which economic theory has  22
assumed to govern the expectation formation process could lead individuals to form mistaken 
expectations and, therefore, to adopt unadapted courses of action. Nevertheless, as far as the co-
ordination problem is concerned, expectations are relevant due to a different reason, namely, due 
not to the norms which define how they are formed, but to their volatile nature; that is, to the fact 
that ‘the basis for ... expectations is very precarious. Being based on shifting and unreliable 
evidence, they are subject to sudden and violent changes’ (Keynes, 1973a [1936], p. 315). 
For Keynes, leaving other variables aside, the rate of investment depends on the marginal 
efficiency of capital, which, at the same time, depends on the expectations of the future, i.e., on 
the state of confidence (ibid., p. 149). Therefore, the volatility which characterises expectations is 
transmitted to investment through the dependence relationship of the latter on the former. As a 
consequence, a fall in the marginal efficiency of capital caused by pessimistic expectations would 
bring about a situation in which:  
investments ... are expected to yield less than nothing; and the resulting collapse of 
new investment then leads to a state of unemployment in which the investments ... 
in fact yield less than nothing. We reach a condition where there is a shortage of 
houses, but where nevertheless no one can afford to live in the houses there are 
(ibid., p. 322). 
Whatever the profit rate of the investments which might have been made in this situation, 
the result is that the level at which supply and demand are equal is critically low or, at least, lower 
than what would be desirable and avoidable by ensuring collectively that the amount of 
investment—or the effective demand in general—is enough. 
The fact that ‘expectations about social and economic events are embodied in our habits 
of action’ (Butos & Koppl, 1997, p. 350) cannot prevent the precariousness of the resolution of 
the co-ordination problem to which a pessimistic state of confidence would have led. Other  23
possible criticisms aside,
5 the difficulties of Butos & Koppl’s theory of expectations to deal with 
this precariousness stems from the argument that current expectation-forming procedures are, like 
spontaneously-emerged norms, survivors of a competitive selection process. In their own words: 
‘The evolutionary selection processes at work among thoughts and actions tend to select “fit” 
expectations and to weed out “unfit” expectations’ (ibid., p. 355). The problem is that when 
potential investors are overcome by a pessimistic state of confidence there is no investment action 
to be selected. That is, when the economy is in a recession phase, the question is not what 
expectations are correct and what planned actions must be selected, but the scarcity of investment 
decisions. In this sense, competition can select actions, but cannot, by definition, select or weed 
out inaction. Indeed, potential investor’s inaction is itself a conscious decision to stay away from 
the influence of the market forces. It is a way to protect her assets against the probable, perverse 
effects which competition might cause in a situation where the uncertainty about the future is 
                                                 
5 Burczak (2001a, p. 70) has levelled the following criticism against Butos & Koppl’s theory of 
expectations. For an evolutionary selection process to lead to reliable and stable expectations, the economic 
environment itself should be relatively stable and Hayekian entrepreneurs cannot be especially creative. In 
their reply to Burczak, Koppl & Butos (2001, pp. 84-85) state that stability is a matter of degree. That is, 
any event is at the same time unique and typical, and its typicality and uniqueness have to be defined in 
terms of what agents know and when they know it. On this basis, ‘Big Players’ aside, they claim that 
changes in the market always occur progressively. That is, according to Carabelli and De Vecchi’s 
interpretation of Hayek’s thought, ‘conventions guarantee the coordination of individual plans of action and 
the stability of society, because they change slowly in time’ (2001, p. 279). This way, Koppl & Butos are 
able to restate the conclusion drawn from their theory of expectations; namely, individuals’ expectations 
will be compatible due to their embodiment in spontaneously-emerged norms. Finally, in his reply, Burczak 
states that ‘Post Keynesians believe that the economic process is subject to sudden and discontinuous 
transformations that can destabilize the existing state of confidence, possibly leading potential 
entrepreneurs to a flight liquidity’ (2001b, p. 88).   24
tinged with pessimism or, at least, lack of optimism. In this situation, potential investors might 
prefer to keep their assets liquid. For, if ‘[i]nvestment is the giving of hostages to fortune’, 
‘[l]iquidity is the means of coping with “lack of knowledge of the yet non-existent”’ (Shackle, 
1989, pp. 54 and 49). 
Butos & Koppl’s statement ‘that a Hayekian theory is needed to understand a Keynesian 
world’ is unsound, therefore, because the theory of expectations which they have constructed is 
unable to explain generalised inaction. Unless we accept that Hayek’s selection process has 
engendered an expectation-forming regularity of behaviour which entails something like ‘not to 
invest when uncertainty seems to suggest that prospective returns might be rather low than high’, 
this Hayekian theory of expectations could not explain Keynesian inaction. In particular, it would 
not be able to argue why and how an economic crisis can be produced as a result of a situation in 
which planned actions become planned inaction, making aggregate investment shrink. Resorting 
to ‘Big Players’ as the only possible cause of the shrinkage of the type of action which ‘makes the 
wheel go round’ does not seem to be too accurate. Note in this regard that the question under 
discussion, for the potential investor, is just a commonsensical problem of preventing failures 
when she has whatever kind of reasons to believe that her investment might fail. Since the 
purchase of new capital goods usually involves a relatively great outlay of money for firms—and, 
therefore, mistaken investments might cause a firm to go bankrupt—when ‘the fears of loss’ are 
stronger than ‘the hopes of profits’ investors would prefer inaction.  
While these reasons do not disappear and ‘the fears of loss’ are not outweighed by ‘the 
hopes of profits’, unemployment will remain too high. Nevertheless, according to the way in 
which social order has been defined above, a negative shift in the state of confidence does not 
imply discoordination of economic activity. The rate of investment will fall and the amount of 
unemployed (known) resources will increase. Competition, therefore, will let its effects be felt in 
the planned actions of more providers of resources. As far as investment decisions are concerned, 
there will be less planned actions to be selected. But competition will still ensure that the solution  25
of the co-ordination problem is achieved, however low the level at which demand and supply 
meet is and no matter the amount of unemployed resources. This is the logic of the market. As 
Snippe has indicated in terms of equilibrium, ‘we may say that Keynes’s analysis assumes the 
economy is always in a temporary equilibrium’ (1985, p. 268). What Keynes’s conception entails 
and explains is that, besides the full employment solution, there is a whole spectrum of very 
likely solutions to the co-ordination problem in which known resources are unemployed, despite 
there still being uncovered needs, and in which expectations might not ‘be mostly realised’. This 
type of solution is excluded by ‘Hayek’s faith in the efficacy of social evolution’ (Butos & Koppl, 
1997, p. 337). 
The idea that expectations are embodied in habits and norms of conduct is not, 
nevertheless, unworthy of consideration. There are probably many planned decisions which rest 
on expectations formed, whether consciously or not, on the basis of current norms. However, in 
accordance with its incapacity to explain the investment inaction which characterises periodical 
depressions, the Hayekian theory of expectations developed by Koppl & Butos cannot be 
considered better grounded just because ‘Keynes’s approach does not leave us with much to say 
about “why” the state of confidence is what it is and what might change it’ (Koppl & Butos, 
2001, p. 86). Keynes himself pointed out that ‘[t]here is, however, not much to be said about the 
state of confidence “a priori”’ (1973a [1936], p. 149). But this does not mean that the state of 
confidence is a ‘diabolus ex machina’ (Koppl, 1991, p. 204), that is, an uncaused cause on which 
the perverse fluctuations of the rest of variables of his theoretical system rests. What it means is 
that, often, the effective causes which give rise to shifts in entrepreneurial expectations when 
economic agents are subject to uncertainty about the future can only be ascertained ‘a posteriori’. 
That is, when the state of confidence has already shifted or is shifting. In this sense, as Dow and 
Dow have suggested, ‘animal spirits ... can be treated ... as exogenous, on operational rather than 
logical grounds’ (1985, p. 58). We know that, at a certain moment, the index of entrepreneurial 
confidence of a certain economy reverses its upward trend and starts showing that ‘the fears of  26
losses’ are outweighing ‘the hopes of profits’. In this situation, the causes of this reversal can be 
analysed and discussed. However, we can hardly elaborate, ‘a priori’, a closed list of all the facts 
which might influence or cause a shift in the state of confidence. The requirement of definitive, 
unique cause-effect relationship is more characteristic of neoclassical model building.  
Keynes himself, however, points out some likely causes which might give rise to doubts 
about the reliability of expected profits and bring about, as a consequence, a shift in the state of 
confidence. In particular, under their ignorance of the future, doubts of potential investors or 
disinvestors might arise ‘perhaps [because] the current yield shows signs of falling off, as the 
stock of newly produced durable goods steadily increases ... [or because] current costs of 
production are thought to be higher than they will be later on’ (1973a [1936], p. 317). These 
causes do not necessarily have to do with whether the Austrian ‘diabolus ex machina’—namely, 
‘Big Players’—is playing or not the market game. The fact, for instance, that at a certain point of 
the entrepreneurial process firms’ finished-goods stock is increasing because demand is falling 
would not be necessarily precluded in an ‘unhampered market’ without ‘Big Players’. It could be 
the result, for instance, of the end of the possibilities for investment opened by a technological 
development, or it could be due to an insufficient level of investment and, hence, of demand as 
income grows. What would disappear in this type of market, by contrast, is the possibility to 
ensure that effective demand is sufficient. These causes do not imply, either, that investors have 
emerged from a dark uncertainty about the future into the light. They still ‘simply do not know’. 
The present, however, is giving hints which do not diminish their uncertainty about future events, 
but increase their fears. Stretching Keynes’s conventional assumption ‘that the existing state of 
affairs will continue indefinitely’, it could even be said that they might fear that the current 
tendency to increase which finished-goods stock has shown will be maintained in the next period. 
If these fears inhibit investment decisions, effective demand will then be even weaker, so that 
more potential investment decisions will be inhibited. As a result, the preference for inactivity 
might spread contagiously.  27
In this vein, assuming that investors’ behaviour could be understood in terms of a 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in which investing is thought of as cooperating and not 
investing as defecting,
6 two particular investors would have to decide whether to invest or not in a 
particular move. As Axelrod (1984) has shown, in this type of repeated prisoner’s dilemma, Tit-
for-Tat is a strategy with survival value; that is, it is a rule of behaviour whose robust success 
against other rules makes it possible that, under certain circumstances, it can emerge, spread and 
protect itself once established spontaneously. However, uncertainty might add an unexpected 
element of reasoning to the decision problem. Note in this regard that taking it into consideration 
implies transgressing the rules of the game, but not doing so would entail turning one’s back on 
the evidence that uncertainty pervades all decisions. In this sense, for instance, as a consequence 
of her uncertainty about the future, one of the investors involved in the decision problem could 
become pessimistically doubtful at a certain moment about her actions’ payoffs. As a result, even 
if she had been following a Tit-for-Tat strategy up to that point, and in spite of the other 
investor’s decision to increase her rate of investment in the previous move, she might decide not 
to do so in the current move. This would be just a decision adopted in order to protect her position 
in the face of the fear of losses. If the other agent were still following a Tit-for-Tat strategy, she 
would choose not to invest in the following round too. This way, the not investing decision would 
be spreading and hence the causes of an incipient crisis would be reinforced. In brief, a norm as 
Tit-for-Tat which is supposed to emerge and spread spontaneously as a consequence of its 
survival value might, in certain conditions, not prevent the negative outcomes produced by the 
fear of losses from being brought about by the interrelation among investors. Indeed, it could 
even help to strengthen those results. 
                                                 
6 I am indebted to Steve Pressman for having suggested the possibility of understanding investors’ 
behaviour in terms of the prisoner’s dilemma. 
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The logic of the market is that of a process which takes place in real time, and time itself 
implies change, uncertainty, ignorance and doubt. In order to understand the operation of the 
market, particularly on the downward slope of the cycle, the analysis of the range of possible 
causes which might raise doubts about future profits is essential. However, this analysis cannot 
lose sight of the fact that its conclusions can hardly be definitive ‘a priori’. For expectations are 
sensitive, too, ‘to factors which do not really make much difference of the prospective yield’ 
(Keynes, 1973a [1936], p. 154), but which can lead to an ‘error of pessimism’ (ibid., p. 322). 
They are as fragile as the investment decisions based on them are volatile. In brief, it is no less 
important to be aware that, however it arises, ‘[o]nce doubt begins it spreads rapidly’ (ibid., p. 
317).  
 
  6. Conclusion 
  If individuals could not make use of the knowledge of the ‘here’ and ‘now’ which they 
possess often in an exclusive way, an incalculable range of opportunities for innovation and 
improvement would be wasted. This is an undeniable economic reason to ensure that individuals 
have a protected sphere of liberty where they can decide freely how and when to achieve what 
they want. As a consequence of the adoption of this decentralised decision-making system, the 
process of the market can be understood as a co-ordination problem among the decisions of 
demand and supply adopted by a crowd of individuals. Competition will always, in the last resort, 
assure that this problem is solved. However, the mechanisms and institutions which, according to 
Hayek, are in charge of improving this solution can only do so in an imperfect way; that is, with 
the failure of a number of planned actions which is greater than what Hayek’s faith in the 
endogenous forces of the market led him to assume. 
Moreover, Hayek’s theory of expectations cannot explain the possibility that potential 
investors opt for Keynesian generalised inactivity. That is, that, in certain circumstances, 
investors might decide to keep their assets liquid due to an insufficiency of demand or to the  29
volatile nature of expectations. In brief, Butos & Koppl’s argument is able to deal with how 
competition filters out expectations which generate losses, but it cannot deal with ‘the fear of 
losses’. In a situation in which these fears are as uncertain as ‘the hopes of profits’, but stronger 
than them, the amount of unemployed resources will increase. Leaving aside those who have 
decided to keep their assets liquid, the greater this amount, the greater the number of disappointed 
planned decisions. 
  This paper, however, is not intended to reject Hayek’s ideas. Indeed, the understanding of 
the market as a co-ordination problem à la Hayek and the problems related to it could prove to be 
extremely fruitful. Just note how many individuals are involved in any ordinary action which is 
enabled by the market. All of them are co-ordinated by means of a blind process without a 
subject. Problems arise when crisis comes. For many of those individuals might be excluded from 
the correspondence between supply and demand. In the end, the order the market process brings 
about is just that: either whoever cannot sell what she has to sell or whoever cannot buy what she 
wants to buy is out of that order. 
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